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FOREWORD

On December 10 and 11, 1998, over 100 scholars, civilian
government officials, and military officers from the United
States, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama and Mexico
gathered at the U.S. Army War College to discuss
“Landpower and Ambiguous Warfare: The Challenge of
Colombia in the 21st Century.” While the conference
adopted no resolutions or conclusions, it provided a valuable
forum for expressing widely differing viewpoints on critical
components of Colombia’s security situation.
The meeting highlighted the urgency of the Colombian
crisis and the need for a comprehensive response by
Colombia, the United States, and the regional community of
nations. Much of the dialogue developed the principal
subthemes of the conference: the sources of violence; the role
of the guerrillas, paramilitaries, and narcotraffickers; the
institutional capabilities and responses of the Colombian
government and armed forces; and the role of the United
States. Here, there was sharp disagreement among the
participants, with some arguing in favor of an increased
U.S. counternarcotics and/or counterinsurgency role and
others emphasizing the priority of the peace process.
This report, by Dr. Richard Downes, summarizes the
issues addressed and the major concerns of the attendees.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer the
monograph as a contribution to the national security debate
on Colombia within the United States and abroad.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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LANDPOWER AND AMBIGUOUS WARFARE:
THE CHALLENGE OF COLOMBIA
IN THE 21st CENTURY

What’s at Stake in Colombia.
There was an implicit recognition that Colombia’s
current situation has reached crisis proportions, with dire
consequences for Colombian citizens, their government,
neighboring nations, and the United States. While violence
has been an important constant in Colombia’s recent past,
its increased tempo and scope since the early 1980s have
edged Colombia toward a political abyss of civil war and the
partial collapse of the state. The difficulties inherent in
arranging for peace among combatants, while satisfying the
interests of multiple national and international actors,
seem to be overwhelming policymakers. After reviewing
Colombian government efforts to attain peace, one
prominent Colombian political figure asked: “How can we
do more?” This, even as various academic analysts
highlighted their doubts about the effectiveness and intent
of various Colombian government programs and another
alleged an “ideological agreement” between Colombia’s
armed forces and paramilitary outlaws. Others debated the
relevancy of various historical examples of conflict
resolution and the relative importance of the battlefield
situation to the peace process. Discussions of U.S. policy
toward Colombia highlighted the U.S. priority on combating
narcotics trafficking from both affirmative and critical
perspectives.
Conference dialogue dramatized the overwhelmingly
negative dimensions of the current conflict. Former U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia Myles Frechette cited the threats
to Colombia’s democracy and economy presented by the
combination of a weak justice system, corruption incited by
illegal drug trafficking, and continual violence generated by
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narcotraffickers, paramilitary groups, and 15,000 to 20,000
guerrillas arrayed in three armies on 100 fronts. Violence
ordered by narcotraffickers kills judges and senior
government officials, and intimidates legislators into
defeating or weakening the government’s ability to confront
crime. Another former State Department official pointed
out that the international community does not appreciate
the extent of Colombia’s human tragedy, with four times the
number of people killed over the past 8 years in Colombia
than in the Balkans. The ongoing rural to urban migration,
in the opinion of one analyst, is the greatest in the world in
the last 10 years and comparable to events in Rwanda and
Bosnia. By his count, between 900,000 and 1 million persons
have been internally displaced in Colombia. “Hyperviolence,” marked by 30,000 murders per year and a total
collapse of penal justice, has superseded the capacity of the
state to deal with crimes. Even though the state is far from
disappearing, it has responded by engaging in illegal
activities that include social cleansing by the police and a
host of illegitimate actions by other state actors.
Another response has been the rise of independent,
illegal armed groups known as “paramilitaries,” which
originated as self-defense organizations and are growing in
numbers and power. They are dedicated to eliminating the
guerrillas by indirect and vicious attacks. Particularly
troubling, in the judgment of Professor Gustavo Gallón, a
visiting researcher at the University of Notre Dame’s
Kellogg Institute, are murders of noncombatants—political
activists, trade unionists, peasant activists, human rights
workers, and ordinary citizens—overwhelmingly at the
hand of paramilitary groups. In the judgment of the
Commander of Colombia’s Armed Forces, Army General
Fernando Tapias Stahelin, massacres committed by the
paramilitaries and guerrillas are polarizing the country and
raising the specter of civil war. Despite “heroic” efforts to
combat the drug trade, Colombia now produces 80 percent of
the world’s cocaine and at least 50 percent of the heroin
seized on the U.S. East Coast. In recent years, rural order
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has broken down, the area under guerrilla control has
expanded, and a national economic crisis has ensued from
the fall in prices of Colombia’s oil exports. While attempting
to be optimistic about recent events, a senior Colombian
military officer noted that narcotrafficking continues to
generate nearly $500 million per year in revenue for the
guerrilla forces.
In a paper written for the conference, former Foreign
Minister of Colombia Noemí Sanín maintains that the
problem is systemic. The political system, she argues, is
undemocratic because it denies “participation . . . to
different expressions of thought . . .” Moreover, the political
parties have “failed to respond to the actual problems of the
country: violence, poverty, impunity, corruption, and lack of
education and health services.”
The economic and political costs of Colombia’s internal
struggles are painfully apparent to Colombia’s neighbors.
In the opinion of a senior military officer, Colombian
guerrillas have taken advantage of weak vigilance on its
borders to acquire military supplies and precursor
chemicals for drug processing. Panama is forced to “bend in
the wind” because it is unable to prevent use of its territory
and harassment of its population in the Darién region by
guerrillas, paramilitaries, and common criminals seeking
supplies and relaxation. Colombian self-defense groups
have killed at least 10 people in Panama, and hundreds of
displaced Colombians have sought refuge across the porous
border. The Panamanian government has responded with
the creation of a border police force of 1,200 and a $88
million integral development plan. In the judgment of
journalist Berta Thayer, however, the country’s border with
Colombia remains thoroughly permeable and impossible to
control. Drug traffickers continue using Panamanian
territory, and money-launderers, smugglers, and illegal
arms traffickers also use it as an operational base.
Ecuador feels threatened as well. It currently hosts
350,000 Colombian citizens, many of whom are illegal
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immigrants, and their presence is related to rising crime
rates and especially bank robberies, in the opinion of
Colonel Luis Hernández of the Ecuadorian army.
Cross-border attacks originating in Colombia have claimed
the lives of 20 Ecuadorian soldiers and police officers. In
response to the nearby violence, Ecuador has increased its
military presence in the jungle region along the border, and
the Ecuadorian military carries out combined operations
with local Colombian military commanders. There is no
central coordination, though, and Colonel Hernández
envisions more military operations in the border region and
increased illegal immigration if Colombia’s peace
negotiations fail. Violence on the Colombian border has
replaced the Peruvian issue as Ecuador’s premier security
challenge.
Mexico fears the “Colombianization” of its own political
process because of the influence of narcotraffickers and the
reproduction of Colombian political forms within its own
borders. Caught in the middle between producing and
consuming countries, Mexico’s function as a transshipment
area has created strongly negative pressures on its already
weakened state and social structures. The security and
justice systems are especially vulnerable, with a decided
lack of continuity in the leadership of the Attorney
General’s office. According to Professor Raul Benítez of the
National Autonomous University of Mexico, 80 percent of
Mexico’s police commanders are tied to the cartels. Mexican
criminal organizations are joining forces with members of
the Russian mafia and Colombian drug traffickers,
especially in the Yucatán peninsula. This difficult situation
requires international collaboration at far higher levels
than those currently reached, while even existing ties are
weakened by a mutual lack of trust and confidence. Peace in
Colombia is essential to confronting the threats arising
from narcotrafficking.
Venezuela also has incurred heavy costs arising from
Colombia’s crisis. It has been forced to absorb nearly three
million Colombian immigrants and to confront drug4

trafficking, kidnapping, blackmail, bribery, car theft,
smuggling, cattle rustling, and the attack and harassment
of its military units on the Colombian border. “Achieving
peace in Colombia is of fundamental importance to
Venezuela,” declared retired Venezuela Air Force General
Boris Saavedra. Security threats emanating from Colombia
have forced Venezuela to extensively increase its military
presence in the border regions and may even place in
jeopardy the expansion of trade and investment between
the two countries. Control by the “narcoguerrillas” of
segments of Colombian territory would have a serious
impact on bilateral relations. In his opinion, the narcoguerrilla problem “is rapidly becoming a hemispheric
security problem because it affects all areas of society” and
must be included in the agendas of international agencies,
regional and global.
Colombia’s problems jeopardize the United States in
multiple ways. The impact of the drug industry has been
devastating on U.S. society. Annual U.S. imports of 300
million tons of cocaine, 70 percent of Colombian origin, have
caused 100,000 deaths and $300 billion in costs in the last
10 years. Cocaine imports feed the habits of 12 million drug
users in the United States, including 3.6 million addicts,
contribute to 14,000 drug-related deaths per year, and lead
to untold economic costs for health care, public safety, and
the loss of productivity. Because of the surge in arrests
related to drugs, one of every 155 U.S. citizens is
incarcerated. More U.S. citizens are behind bars than
serving in the armed forces. Colombia’s illegal drug trade
constitutes a national security threat to the United States,
and its internal violence has resulted in the kidnapping of
several U.S. citizens. The 25,000 U.S. citizens living in
Colombia endure varying degrees of risk because of the
internal situation. Economically, Colombia serves as a
major market for U.S. exports, and 41 percent of Colombia’s
exports are destined for the United States. Two-way
U.S.-Colombian trade is 60 percent higher than U.S.Chilean trade, four times that of the U.S. trade with the
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countries of former Yugoslavia, and 400 of the Fortune 500
companies operate in Colombia. The United States is the
leading source of foreign investment. From the U.S.
perspective, the current environment raises serious doubts
about Colombia’s political and economic future.
A Series of Troubling Issues.
Implicit agreements on the seriousness of the challenges
to Colombia’s democracy and to the security of neighboring
states masked widely differing positions on a series of
issues. Major disagreements became evident on the
relationship between drug trafficking and systemic
violence, the roles of the armed forces and police in
combating that violence, a proper role for the United States,
and the components and mechanics of the peace process.
True to the conference’s title, “ambiguous warfare”
inherently makes building a consensus on who is the enemy
and a proper strategy to defeat him an exceedingly complex
task.
The Relationship between Illegal Drug Trafficking and
Systemic Violence. Two antagonistic interpretations arose
concerning the relationship between narcotrafficking and
the systemic violence plaguing the country. One holds that
the narcotraffickers are the primary generators of the
violence; the other posits that violence represents a
response to a breakdown in political consensus and to
dysfunctional social practices. The commander of
Colombia’s armed forces, Army General Fernando Tapias
Stahelin, placed the blame squarely on narcotrafficking. He
explained that the armed forces’ recognition of the
relationship between trafficking and violence has led them
to make the interruption of the links between the
narcotraffickers and the guerrillas the primary military
objective. The director of Colombia’s national police,
General José Serrano, credits narcotrafficking with
providing both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries with
the economic resources to support their violence. A former
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Colombian official supported this view by claiming that 70
percent of the combat power of the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) derives from
controlling narcotrafficking activities. Thus, the traffickers
and the FARC, by implication, have vested interests in
sustaining the ongoing domestic conflict. In the opinion of R.
Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics Matters and Law Enforcement, over the past
several years the union between narcotraffickers and
guerrillas has become more evident than ever. Also lending
some support to this interpretation were comments by
Professor Marc Chernick of Georgetown University, who
noted that Colombia’s violence has changed in nature and
actors since the 1940s. While similarities exist with
previous periods, the insertion of Colombia into the world
economy of narcotrafficking is one reason for the worsening
situation and has fueled much of the conflict.
Others raised doubts about the degree of dependency
between the narcotraffickers and the guerrillas or
paramilitaries. A statement by Colombian Minister of
Defense Rodrigo Lloreda that the FARC charges the
narcotraffickers taxes of $500 million per year was
subsequently challenged by a researcher who argued that
the figure represented a tentative estimate. A representative of a nongovernmental organization stated that it
was not clear how the guerrillas actually tax the
narcotraffickers. Marc Chernick argued that “narcoguerrillas” is a misnomer. In his opinion, the guerrillas are
fundamentally political, not essentially a drug cartel, and
use criminal activities used to finance war, building an
army in the process. Further questioning the extent of
guerrilla dependence upon narcotrafficking was Professor
Nazih Richani of George Washington University. He stated
that the FARC presence in areas under its control preceded
coca cultivation by decades, and that it receives less than 40
percent of its income from narcotrafficking. He explained
that the guerrillas have successfully expanded their power
since the 1980s by focusing on “large landowners, large
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cattle ranchers, the commercial bourgeoisies, and
multinationals,” in addition to taxing coca growers.
Between 1991 and 1995, they increased their presence in
the nation’s municipalities by 44 percent, achieving a
presence in over half of Colombia’s 1,094 municipalities.
Similarly, Daniel García-Peña of the Woodrow Wilson
Center maintained that even though the guerrillas tax the
drug trade, they are not narcotraffickers. He argued that
narcotrafficking is a phenomenon involving multiple actors
that fuels violent as well as seemingly legitimate businesses
throughout Colombia. Though some elements of the
paramilitaries are engaged in narcotrafficking and there is
a “tortured history” of ties between the drug traffickers and
paramilitaries, David Spencer of George Washington
University maintained that the extent of the current
paramilitaries’ dependence on narcotrafficking is not clear.
Since the conference did not explore the issue of the
narcotraffickers as a separate entity (or entities), no clear
image emerged of the extent of their dependence upon
guerrilla, paramilitary, or other armed resources.
Further doubts were raised about whether the guerrillas
themselves, regardless of the extent of their ties to the
narcotraffickers, were primarily responsible for the violent
state of Colombia. A former U.S. ambassador credited the
insurgents with responsibility for 23 percent of the killings
and 50 percent of the kidnappings experienced by
Colombian society. Professor Francisco Thoumi of the
University of the Andes placed even less blame at the
guerrillas’ feet, observing that only 10 to 15 percent of
murders could be explained by political violence, the rest
being “socially-driven.” Thoumi stood the previous
argument on its head by stating that it was the weakness of
the Colombian state that explained the growth of drug
trafficking. This industry is not explained by economic
forces, he reasoned, since most countries that could produce
drugs, such as India, Thailand, or Indonesia, choose not to
do so. Rather, its rise is due to several factors: the weakness
of the state, derived from a fragmented, patrimonial, and
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clientelistic political system; the level of impunity compared
with possible profits; and the general breakdown in social
controls. The latter includes a lack of consensus about
property and property rights that makes kidnapping merely
a transfer payment. Colombians are continuing the search
for “El Dorado” initiated during the Spanish Conquest and
employing systematic corruption, marked by pay-offs at the
local level to facilitate illicit activities. Corruption and drugs
have generated an interactive process wherein the drug
industry has become a catalyst for corruption affecting the
political system in unprecedented ways. Generally
supporting his observations was Eduardo Pizarro of the
National University of Colombia, who argued that the
Colombian state had undergone a partial collapse since
1989, marked by its loss of monopoly over legitimate
violence in the face of high indices of criminality and
impunity, the absence of state presence in many regions,
and the burdens of two wars: one against the guerrillas, and
the other against narcotrafficking.
The Roles of the Armed Forces and Police in Combating
Colombian Violence. Equally divergent were views about
the roles of the armed forces and police in sustaining
democracy by combating the current violence. Colombian
military and police representatives were highly defensive of
recent measures undertaken to develop an effective
strategy to combat narcotraffickers, guerrillas, and
paramilitary groups. Others were strongly critical of the
army and police, arguing that they tacitly supported
paramilitary groups and misguidedly attacked peasants
growing coca, while ignoring the true drug traffickers who
live in cities.
In the view of the Colombian army, the last 10 years’
confrontations have brought the nation to the brink of civil
war and ecological devastation. Even though army and
police units have killed over 700 paramilitary and guerrilla
fighters and captured another 29,755, insurgent activity is
causing an annual $1 billion loss in oil revenues, paramilitary participation has increased, and the Putumayo
9

region near the Ecuadorian border has fallen under
guerrilla control. The armed forces and police suffered over
600 casualties in the latest year of fighting. Neighboring
countries are allowing the narcotraffickers to launder
money, and the current state of law (as opposed to a state of
emergency) is more appropriate for a state at peace instead
of one engaged in an armed struggle with various
subversive groups. Meanwhile, the armed forces have been
subjected to unjustified criticism of the military justice
system.
Nevertheless, in their view, the armed forces have
registered progress by bringing the paramilitaries under
control and decreasing FARC revenues, while respecting
human rights and international law. The armed forces have
adopted an offensive stance and are engaging the
paramilitaries. They have recently killed 35 members of
paramilitary groups and brought another 230 to justice.
David Spencer shared the Colombian military’s perspective
on this issue, pointing out that even though both use
weapons against a common enemy, army and police actions
have hurt the paramilitaries. While there may have been
personal links between some army officers and
paramilitaries at the brigade commander level in the past
and retired officers and former soldiers have joined the
paramilitary groups, officers who have not responded to the
paramilitary threat have been indicted. The paramilitaries
are gathering strength not from state assistance, but
because they are effective at terminating petty crime and
restoring order, and thus have gained the support of large
landowners, fishermen, cattlemen, drug traffickers, and
other elements who felt victimized by the guerrillas. Army
action also caused FARC revenues to fall by several million
dollars in 1997. The armed forces have installed 115 human
rights officers and transferred between 300 and 400 cases
from military courts to civil justice, resulting in 57
convictions of armed forces’ members. According to the
Colombian Armed Forces Commander, the 230,000
members of the military and police have no links with death
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squads, and evaluations of the armed forces’ human rights
performance should be based upon current information, not
historical incidents.
Strategically, the armed forces are adopting an offensive
attitude, interrupting the links between the narcotraffickers and the “generators of violence,” combating all
“generators of violence” by attacking guerrillas and
paramilitaries with equal vigor, and strengthening
relations with the civilian population while protecting it
and the country’s natural resources. They are combating
the guerrillas’ infrastructure support system and complementing the action of the police. Ongoing restructuring will
increase the training and modernization of the armed forces
by replacing with professional soldiers 15,000 of 35,000 high
school graduate soldiers (bachilleres) who are prohibited by
law from entering combat. The Colombian air and marine
forces are also participating in the destruction of the drug
infrastructure, and the armed forces as a whole are
enhancing their mobility, communications, and intelligence
capabilities, preparing themselves for action in the event of
the failure of the peace process. The creation of a special
counternarcotics battalion will complement the anti-drug
activities of the national police.
The national police remain engaged in fumigating illegal
crops, destroying drug labs, combating money laundering,
destroying clandestine landing strips, and controlling jails
where some drug leaders are kept. Police Director General
José Serrano credits his forces with fumigating 60,000
hectares, thereby preventing increased drug cultivation,
confiscating 20,000 properties worth $2 billion, and
destroying large trafficking organizations. His force is
preparing to utilize six new Blackhawk helicopters
authorized by the U.S. Congress to accelerate eradication of
poppy crops.
Other conference participants questioned whether
Colombia’s armed forces are using effective and legitimate
means to secure legitimate ends. One U.S. civilian academic

11

charged the Colombian military with participation or
acquiescence in the illegal activities of the paramilitaries.
Another charged the state with complicity in illegal
violence, and claimed that human rights violations by
military officers were continuing. Some officers with records
of human rights violations apparently remain within the
Colombian armed forces. The head of the Office of Andean
Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, Phillip Chicola,
noted that shuffling senior officers with a record of human
rights “problems” from one unit to another was an
insufficient remedy and made collaboration difficult. A
Colombian academic suggested that the armed forces’
tactics targeting the population from helicopters could be
counterproductive, leading to human rights violations and
generating even more conflict. In his opinion, human rights
violations must be monitored independently, given that
current steps to improve the human rights situation are
ambiguous and their results uncertain. He advocated
adoption of a human rights policy that would advance peace,
such as the creation of a special mechanism for truth and
justice, as has occurred in other nations in the region. Only
confrontation with paramilitary groups, dismissal of state
agents engaged in human rights violations, and an end to
impunity will be effective, he argued.
A Proper Role for the United States. Discussions of the
U.S. role engendered multiple and often contradictory
observations. The host of the conference, Army War College
Commandant Major General Robert Scales, challenged
conference participants to sharpen a definition of what U.S.
assistance is needed for Colombia, even as he sounded a
cautionary note, advising that sometimes assistance can be
“counterproductive.” Several members of the Clinton
Administration’s foreign policy community highlighted the
current emphasis on counternarcotics, but academics,
retired diplomats, and military officers questioned the
rationale for such a policy and suggested alternative
priorities.
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According to Phillip Chicola, counternarcotics is the
“centerpiece and most difficult and prominent issue of our
bilateral relationship.” This choice was apparently based
upon practical and political reasons. Thomas Umberg of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy said that placing
counterdrugs at the center of the U.S.-Colombian
relationship confronts a national security threat emanating
from Colombia and supports the President’s drug strategy,
especially goals four and five that call for shielding
America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat
and breaking the foreign and domestic drug supply sources.
R. Rand Beers noted that this strategy has four major goals
with respect to Colombia: 1) enhancement of the Government of Colombia’s intelligence capability; 2) eradication
and alternate development; 3) interdiction; and, 4) the
strengthening of Colombian law enforcement agencies and
the administration of justice. The United States recognizes
the need for the Colombian government to regain control
over the coca-growing areas, according to Umberg.
The United States believes it can effectively assist
Colombian military and police, who are “at the heart of a
solution.” The amount of U.S. resources available to
Colombia has increased significantly in 1998, with the
passage of emergency supplemental funding that should
allow Colombia to conduct a more successful counternarcotics program. Coupled with regular appropriations,
total U.S. funding for the current fiscal year has reached
nearly $300 million, and $15 million is programmed to
support alternative crop development over the next 3 years.
According to Beers, this policy represents a consensus
within the U.S. Government that would be placed at risk if
the United States were to attempt to assume a counterinsurgency role. In fact, though, it appears that the United
States recognizes that resources provided for counterdrug
purposes are fungible. In the opinion of one member of the
administration, if counterdrug efforts were to lead to
conflict with guerrilla groups, then “so be it.” However, U.S.
Army Brigadier General James Parker of the U.S. Southern
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Command noted that training for counterdrug actions
differed from training for counterinsurgency because the
former did not include training in artillery, close air
support, or psychological operations.
In Chicola’s opinion, the recent visit of President
Pastrana to the United States opened the door for a
broadening of the relationship. The United States is
dedicated to working with the Colombian government, since
there is no longer any need for the two sides to sit at opposite
sides of the table on multiple issues where cooperation is
possible. However, the Colombian government must deal
effectively with the long record of human rights abuses
allegedly committed by members of the Colombian military.
In addition to counternarcotics and human rights, others
include humanitarian relief, economic reform, access to
investment and trade, environmental concerns, and a broad
range of other areas. According to Chicola, progress has
already been registered on economic issues, a high-level
consultative commission has been established, and the
presidential visit was an outstanding success. In his view,
Colombia has “talked the talk,” and now needs to implement
its plans (“walk the walk”). The United States is prepared to
cooperate in this process.
President Clinton has made it clear that peace in
Colombia is the primary policy objective of the United
States. Achieving peace would make the counternarcotics
effort far more successful, reduce the “comfort level” of the
FARC, and enhance the ability of the United States to trade
and invest. However, Chicola argued that the peace process
is “essentially a Colombian enterprise.” The United States
supports the process, but feels that peace should not come
“at any price.” In the U.S. view, any peace settlement must
allow for continued counternarcotics efforts; it should not
grant impunity to narcotraffickers, nor allow for the
creation of a state within a state, nor overlook Colombia’s
international obligations.
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The U.S. focus on counternarcotics was questioned by a
variety of participants. Professor Caesar Sereseres of the
University of California at Irvine expressed his view that
unless guerrilla issues are also dealt with, U.S. drug policy
would fail. He urged the United States to “get its act
together” and focus on the battlefield in relation to the
prospects for negotiation. Failure to do so, he said, is
“utterly demoralizing” and “utterly confusing” to the
Colombians. Totally contrary advice was offered by Cynthia
Arnson of the Woodrow Wilson Center. While endorsing the
administration’s judgment that there was no consensus for
supporting counterinsurgency activities in Colombia, she
criticized U.S. policy for having contradictory objectives and
for its emphasis on security issues. She applauded the State
Department’s greater emphasis on human rights and
extension of the provisions of the Leahy Amendment. In her
opinion, comments that “criticism of the Colombian military
is unfair” overlook the “principal failure of U.S. policy,” the
absence of a policy with respect to the paramilitaries. She
advocated vigorous movement against the paramilitaries
because of their central threat to the state’s authority.
Daniel García Peña charged that U.S. policy actually helps
the guerrillas by fumigating the peasants in the countryside
and was “completely wrong.” He argued that different
points of view within U.S. policy circles were self-defeating,
and that more emphasis should be dedicated to attaining
peace. Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue
urged the United States to give greater attention to
Colombia at the “highest levels.”
Several former U.S. Government officials also offered
viewpoints differing widely from the administration. A
former senior State Department official, Ambassador David
Passage, charged that U.S. policy toward Colombia showed
that the United States remains “politically haunted and
legislatively crippled by ghosts in its past.” He stated that
the United States is precluded from training police forces,
except in a very narrow sector, because of its inability to
come to grips with the legacy of Vietnam and the murder of a
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U.S. security adviser in Uruguay in 1971. He described the
U.S. unwillingness to train the armed forces as “illogical
and irrational,” given the need for Colombia to regain
control over its territory. He described U.S. national
interests as actions by a “legitimate and democratic”
Colombian government that would 1) determine Colombia’s
own policy and destiny; 2) exercise control over all its
territory; 3) protect the human rights and civilian liberties
of all its citizens; 4) act effectively against corruption; and,
5) commit itself to eliminating drug trafficking. Passage
criticized the U.S. focus on counternarcotics as being
excessively narrow and advocated U.S. assistance in
providing simple training and doctrine in joint and small
unit operations, night operations, and usable operational
intelligence. He also urged assisting in a dramatic
improvement in quick reaction forces and help for creation
of an airborne strike force, better logistics supplies,
improved repair capability and an increased spare parts
inventory. In his view, such U.S. support could be
accomplished at little cost through commitment of modest
resources and small numbers of well-protected people.
Retired U.S. Army General Frederick Woerner, now of
Boston University, urged U.S. policy to give priority
emphasis to promoting 1) the furtherance of democracy; and
2) the reduction of the drug flow, supported by the provision
of some resources. He recommended a subordinate role for
the United States, focusing on planning, communications,
intelligence, and mobility, while standing as an “unrelenting advocate” for human rights. Retired U.S. Ambassador
Edwin G. Corr, now at the University of Oklahoma, termed
the earlier U.S. policy decision to decertify Colombia a
mistake because it failed to recognize Colombia’s sacrifices.
He argued that multiple sources of U.S. appropriations for
foreign activities often lead to contradictory and
cumbersome policy guidance, and stated that the United
States needed to be able to assist Colombia’s police while
observing laws to the letter.
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The Components and Mechanics of the Peace Process.
Viewpoints on how to achieve peace in Colombia proved
even more divergent. Several speakers commented that the
situation in Colombia should be analyzed from a heavily
comparative basis with an important military component,
drawing upon the experiences of Vietnam and El Salvador.
Others argued for the primacy of reforms within Colombia
as the key to successful peace negotiations. Broad
differences also existed as to whether and how the paramilitary forces should participate in the peace process.
Caesar Sereseres argued for greater attention to the
political implications of the battlefield. He expressed his
conviction that “what happens on the battlefield matters”
by setting the context for incentives or disincentives for
serious negotiations. He stated that historically most
conflicts ended on the battlefield and highlighted three
factors that he considered components of a pattern of
success. Drawing from the experiences of Thailand, the
Philippines, and Central America in the 1980s, he stressed
the importance of: 1) the existence of a national campaign
plan, indicating that civilian authorities have assumed
responsibility for the success or failure of military forces on
the battlefield; 2) recognition that counterinsurgency is not
a cheap solution—that it demands financial and political
commitments, including mobilization of the government
and the civilian population; and, 3) an internal reform or
reorganization of the armed forces to suit battlefield
circumstances. The latter always involved a reorganization
of the army and its intelligence structure and the creation of
a special operations command and local defense forces. He
argued that experience showed the need for armies to
conduct a rigorous self-critique, to separate the guerrillas
from the population, to link the battlefield to the negotiation
process, to make the guerrilla infrastructure the primary
target, and to “attrit” enough guerrillas to put the
government in a good position to negotiate. Colombia’s
guerrillas, in his opinion, are dedicated to sustaining a
status quo that allows them to operate a billion-dollar
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business in permissive zones behind a “democratic shield.”
For them, total victory would ironically spell defeat. His
comments were partially supported by General Fred
Woerner, who has been analyzing the issue of defeating
guerrillas in Colombia since 1962. Woerner sees no
possibility of defeating guerrillas and doesn’t see why they
would negotiate if the armed forces are ready to cease
operations against them. Retired Ambassador David
Passage agreed. In the current situation, he knew of
“nothing that would hold out hope for successful peace
negotiations with respect to minimal Colombian goals.”
Sereseres’s assertions were challenged by others, who
judged the military solution to have been tried and failed or
who place less emphasis on military factors (though
Sereseres maintains that he did not propose a military
solution). Daniel García-Peña noted that Colombia already
spends more than the average Latin American country on
the military and that further strengthening the armed
forces cannot be the solution, especially since it would leave
the paramilitary question unanswered. Disagreeing with
Sereseres, he stated that the guerrillas were attempting to
overthrow the state and would not “lose if they win.” Nor
would they disavow their goals, even if severely weakened.
He argued that the guerrillas want peace, but on their
terms. The pressing need, in his opinion, was “to put on the
table issues of a social and political nature that led to the
uprising.” Cynthia Arnson discounted the importance of the
military situation in the resolution of the conflict in El
Salvador. She argued that conditions could change, not just
in response to military stimulus, but also as a function of the
changing agendas and perceptions of the combatants.
Colombian Minister of Defense Lloreda indicated that
broad political support already exists for a peace settlement. He noted that 60 to 70 percent of Colombia’s citizens
favor negotiations and that a “Plan Colombia” has been
prepared, to be financed by $800 million in contributions
over 2 years by the country’s wealthiest taxpayers.
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Marc Chernick also expressed the view that the conflict
was not “winnable” through military means, and that a
stalemate has arisen. The state cannot defeat the guerrillas,
and the guerrillas cannot defeat the state. In his judgment,
the only solution lay in a negotiated settlement that would
be based upon a broad agenda. This would go beyond
disarmament and re-incorporation to bring about major
political reforms not possible through other means. He also
envisioned the need for mediation and financial assistance
from the international community since “peace will be
expensive.” Fundamental issues at the heart of war and
peace, in his opinion, are reforms to advance the democratic
process, preserving access to political power for former
insurgents, resolving land disputes, and dealing with the
lack of state presence in many areas never integrated into
the state. He suggested that the peace process could be used
to achieve control of the drug trade by placing the issue of
illicit crops on the negotiating table, especially since the
continual conflict jeopardizes the success of alternative
forms of development. Also essential to the process is the
dismantling of the paramilitaries, the establishment of the
guerrillas’ confidence in the government, and security for
guerrillas at the local level through an institutionalization
of their local political power. In dealings with the Ejército de
Liberación Nacional, he urged attention to the issue of using
oil revenues to promote agrarian reform and to make
investments in rural areas. In his view, the central issue
overall is how to rebuild the Colombian nation in the context
of peace.
Disagreements were also apparent over how or whether
to include the paramilitaries in the peace process. David
Spencer noted that the paramilitary groups want the same
recognition as the guerrillas and favor a nationally accepted
political settlement, even as they practice extreme criminal
measures to accomplish their goals. Moreover, they will not
lay down arms before the guerrillas do the same. He has
concluded that the paramilitaries are growing in strength,
represent an alienated portion of society, and must be
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included in the peace process. However, Daniel García-Peña
questioned whether it was feasible to include the guerrillas
and the paramilitaries in the same negotiations, and
suggested exploring a parallel process that would disarm
and dismantle the paramilitaries. Minister of Defense
Lloreda pointed out that only three representatives from
the FARC were given the special legal status that will allow
them to participate in negotiations.
Reform of the armed forces could form part of the peace
process, observed Rafael Pardo, former Colombian Minister
of Defense and now a commentator for RCN Television.
Pardo rejected the possibility of such reforms serving as a
“down payment” for the peace process, since it would be
irresponsible to attempt military reform in the midst of the
conflict except to instill greater combat efficiency. Reform
should not be driven by the end of the Cold War or by the
supposed lack of conflicts in the region, since numerous land
and maritime borders remain undefined in the Caribbean
region. However, approaching the issue of how the military
might be reformed in the post-conflict environment might
advance thinking about any future negotiations regarding
the military’s structure. Reductions in the armed forces’ size
would inevitably follow the conflict’s end, as would the issue
of how to integrate regular and irregular forces. Efforts at
resolving these questions could draw upon various national
and international examples. In the process, the reform
could reaffirm Colombia’s democratic nature by separating
the military from politics. Specific measures might include:
1) reviewing the problematical clause that charges the
military with being “defenders of constitutional order”; 2)
naming military commanders for a fixed term, instead of
linking their destiny with civilian ministers of defense who
are often replaced; and, 3) closely examining the issue of
promotion by merit, a principle that should be viewed with
caution because it could introduce political factors into the
promotion process. Further, military reform should
maintain the subordination of the armed forces to the
executive and allow the military autonomy on internal
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military matters, such as promotion and the general
precepts of military strategy. Finally, it should allow the
army to continue to be defined nationally, rather than by
region or state. The armed forces should be able to retain
their status as the institution with the second highest
rating of confidence of the Colombian people. However,
Pardo pointed to the dilemma arising from current
legislation preventing use of high-school graduates in
combat positions as risking the creation of an “army of the
poor,” unrepresentative of the Colombian nation.
Conclusion.
This conference was designed, in the view of its host,
Major General Robert Scales, to help “make strategic sense
of a very complex country,” but it far exceeded its goal. The
issues addressed were ponderous, and answers to the
questions raised led to vigorous discussions extending
beyond the time available and overflowing into small groups
and social gatherings. Some commented that it was the
most intense conference they had attended in years. In the
opinion of one participant, the organizers of the two-day
session had served each attendee an “elephant for lunch” to
be consumed one bite at a time. Those seeking to analyze
Colombia’s current situation were well-served by the depth
of expertise and breadth of professional judgments
presented. The challenges of dealing with the Colombian
case of “landpower and ambiguous warfare” became clearer
than ever.
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